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Learning to Perfect Manipulation: Implications for Fertility, Savings, and Old-Age Social Security

 
Paper:ewp-lab/9705003
From:    
Date: Wed, 28 May 97 18:08:52 CDT

Abstract:
In this paper we consider an overlapping generations model with endogenous fertility and two-sided altruism and show the limitations of applying commonly used open loop Nash equilibrium in characterizing equilibrium transfers from parents to children in the form of bequest, and transfers from children to parents as voluntary old-age support. Since in our model children are concerned with parents' old-age consumption, agents have incentives to save less for old age and to have more children so as to strategically induce their children to transfer more old-age support. We formulate such strategic behavior within a sequential multi-stage game and introduce a notion of learning equilibrium to characterize equilibrium manipulative behavior and then study the consequences of such strategic manipulations on private intergenerational transfers, fertility and savings decisions, and on Pareto optimality of equilibrium allocation. We show that the learning equilibrium notion of the paper simplifies computation of subgame perfect equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium is the long-run outcome of dynamic learning equilibrium paths (this aids in selecting, sometimes, a unique equilibrium among multiple subgame perfect equilibria), and an open-loop Nash equilibrium involves "incredible" threats from children. We provide an alternative explanation for the existence of publicly provided social security program and examine its role to correct distortions created by strategic manipulation.

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EconWPA began as a conversation between Bob Parks and Larry Blume on January 28, 1993. I located Paul Ginsparg's archive (then xxx.lanl.gov) and he graciously installed his software on a Sun Sparc system which was supporting the department of economics email and computation. EconWPA began accepting papers July 1, 1993 and had ftp, email, gopher and web interfaces. The web interface for submissions was engineered into existence in July 1995. A complete and catastrophic machine failure in 1999 caused the loss of EconWPA's email new paper announcment service at which time there were over 15,000 subscriptions with over 8,000 unique email addresses.

In 2005, Arts and Sciences commandeered the computing services that I had provided to the Department of Economics since 1987. Some might say that the department was sold out, others would (erroneously) claim that centralization is efficient, and still others would claim that I have few marketing skills.

I was told that I could keep operating EconWPA (as well as many other services including rfe.wustl.edu, barnett.wustl.edu, and three RePEc servers) but I would receive no support (hardware, software, or anthing else) and (as had been the case) no compensation. At that point, given the apparent low valuation of my activities by the department, and university, it made no sense for me to continue operating EconWPA or other services.

Thanks to all who have supported EconWPA in the past.

A Chinese curse states May you live in intersting times. I have. Bob Parks - Jan 2006